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The Conversational
Process of the Lawby James Boyd White

editor's note: This article is adapted from part of the final
chapter of Professor White's book, When Words Lose Their
Meaning, published by the University of Chicago Press in
1984. In this book, the author works out a method of analysis,
or what he calls a "way of reading," which he exemplifies in
his interpretation of a wide range of texts, drawn from differ
ent historical periods and representing different generic types.
The texts include Homer's Iliad, Thucydides' Peloponne
sian War, Plato's Gorgias, Swift's Tale of a Tub, Samuel
Johnson's Rambler Essays, Jane Austen's Emma, and
Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution. The book
closes with an analysis of The Declaration of Independence,
The Constitution of the United States, and Chief Justice Mar
shall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. In this section
reproduced below, which is part of the conclusion of the book
as a whole, Professor White sketches out his conception of the
law as a rhetorical and literary process. In it references are
occasionally made to other parts of the book.

The most prominent feature of the judicial opinion is
that it is not an isolated exercise of power but part of a
continuing and collective process �f c�n:-7ersatio� and
judgment. The conversation of which 1t 1s a par� 1s not a
political conversation of the usual sort, proceeding as
26

such conversations ordinarily do-by a kind of jostling
and compromise, focusing mainly on the problem of
the immediate present-but a highly formal one, in
which authoritative conclusions are reached after ex
plicit argument. These decisions in their turn become
the material of future arguments leading to future deci
sions, and so on in a continuing process of opening
and closure, argument and judgment, of which no one
can claim to foresee the end.
This is a way of saying that judicial opinions incorpo
rate within their world both the past (to which the
court looks for its authority) and the future (to which
it speaks as an authority). The opinion reaches its_
judgment by elaborating what has gone before-m
McCulloch v. Maryland mainly the language of the Con
stitution and the experience supporting the necessity
of the Bank-but is itself left open to elaboration by
others. This process establishes connections acr?ss.
time of the sort that Burke celebrates, but these 1ud1c1al
connections are not merely attitudinal but systematic
and reliable. The judicial process at once acknowledges
the necessity of cultural change and creates a method
for effecting it.
The way a court works is deeply affected by the kind
of question it addresses. A court normally avoids de
ciding hypothetical questions; it waits, inactive, until a

case is brought before it, which
it is asked by others to decide.
Under our Constitution, in
deed, the federal judicial
power is limited to "cases
arising" under certain circum
stances, and the Supreme Court has elaborated
a complex body of law defining those terms of limita
tion. It requires, for example, that a dispute be brought
by parties with genuinely adverse interests and that it
be neither premature (hence imperfectly focused) nor
stale. It is only when these conditions have been met
that the Court has claimed the power to determine the
constitutionality of acts of the national legislature.
The Court's claim to decide a constitutional question
of this kind to a large degree rests on the fact that it is
better situated to decide it than the legislature that
passed the statute would have been. Suppose, for ex
ample, that Congress passed a statute and then imme
diately sought from a federal court an advisory opinion
on its constitutionality. What claim could the court
properly make that it had the power to do what it was
asked? It could claim some legal expertise, no doubt,
but legislatures do not lack that; some sense of the
world and its demands, but surely no more than the
legislature; some degree of removal from the contem
porary political process, but the timing of the judg
ment sought would tend to blur that distinction, for
judges are not immune to public opinion, and, in a
case like this one, the judge, like the legislator, would
mainly see the present need, since that is what would
be before him. But the situation would be quite differ
ent when time had passed and a conflict had actually
arisen, in the ordinary course of life, which one party
cared enough about to bring before the court, the other
to resist, and when the particular statute had been
seen in operation with other bodies of law and with
other expectations and demands rooted in other pat
terns of need and desire, arising in other times. Now
the judge could make another kind of claim altogether:
that he occupies a position for making a constitutional

judgment that is inherently
superior to that of the legislature
passing the statute and superior
also to what his own position
would have been had he granted
an advisory opinion.
Cases are often not neatly pack
aged in the categories established by legislative or judi
cial rules but exhibit surprising configurations of their
own, bringing to the surface hitherto unseen tensions
and contradictions in our social life and culture. The
legal case is always a narrative; and a narrative, as we
saw in the Iliad, can always be a way of testing the pre
suppositions of the culture, forcing to the bright center
of the mind difficulties we wish to push back into the
twilight. This means that the case is always an invita
tion to the reconstitution of the language in the light of
new circumstances and new intractabilities.
The fact that the case is always a narrative means
something from the point of view of the litigant in
particular. For him the case is, at its heart, an occasion
and a method in which he can tell his story and have it
heard. He has the right to a jury, to ensure that he
will have an audience that will understand his story
and speak his language. The presence of a jury re
quires that the entire story, on both sides, be told in
ordinary language and made intelligible to the ordi
nary person. This is a promise to the citizen that the law
will ultimately speak to him, and for him, in the lan
guage that he speaks, not in a technical or special jar
gon. This, in the terms that Marshall has taught us, is
a continuing acknowledgment of the supremacy of
"the People" who are for us the ultimate source of
law and authority. It is our law, and it must make sense
to us. In addition, by its very structure the legal hear
ing achieves, at least for the moment, a performed
equality among the speakers; this, as we learned
from Thucydides, is the essential premise of the social
practice of argument, as it is of compassion, gratitude,
and indeed of all the social and political activities
of free people. Here equality is not only the condi27
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�on of t�e legal process but its product-perhaps,
indeed, its finest product: equality under law.
The judicial process not only recognizes the indi
vidual but compels him to recognize others. For the
litigant, the lawyer, and the observer alike the central
ethical and social meaning of the practice of the adver
sary hearing is its perpetual lesson that there is always
another side to the story, that yours is not the only
point of view. For the actors as for the judges, the jux
taposition of the two incompatible stories makes us ask
in what language the story should be told again and a
judgment reached; it compels what George Eliot, in de
scribing the function of art, has called an "extension of
[our] sympathies" into an "attention to what is apart
from [our]selves," which, as she says, is the "raw mate
rial" of moral life.
The law can thus be seen as a discipline in the ac
knowledgment of limits, in the recognition of others,
and in the necessity of cooperation.It is a method of
individual and collective self-education, a way in which
we teach ourselves, over and over again, how little we
can foresee, how much we depend on others, and how
important to us are the practices we have inherited
from the past. It is a way of creating a world in part by
imagining what can be said on the other side. In these
ways it is a lesson in humility.

For the litigant, the lawyer, and the ob
server alike the central ethical and social
meaning of the practice of the adversary
hearing is its perpetual lesson that there is
always another side to the story, that yours
is not the only point of view.
But it is more even than this: it is the constitution of a
world by the distribution of authority within it; it estab
lishes the terms on which its actors may talk in conflict
or cooperation among themselves.The law establishes
roles and relations and voices, positions from which
and audiences to which one may speak, and it gives us
as speakers the materials and methods of a discourse.
It is a way of creating a rhetorical community over time.
It is this discourse, working in the social context of its
own creation, this language in the fullest sense of the
term, that is the law. It makes us members of a com
mon world.
This is not a language of social policy and political
philosophy, though there are of course some (often
rather exaggerated) continuities between these realms
of discourse; for in the law questions are never ad
dressed abstractly, and statements are never made to
the air. Every legal speech is made from a defined posi
tion, to a defined audience, in a defined language.
28

The law always assumes
a speaker and audience located in
the context it defines. This is how it makes a
world and makes it real.
The legal text, for example-whether constitution,
trust, statute, or contract-always requires that one
who claims a meaning for it answer the question,
"Who are you when you speak as you do?" What you
wish to say, what you can say, and how what you do
say will be understood will all vary dramatically with
your answer, which might be, for example: "I am the
manager of the condominium established in this agree
ment, and I say... "; "I am the tenant under this lease,
and I say..."; "I am a Justice of the United States Su
preme Court, given authority to decide certain cases of
which I assert this is one, and I say...." Similarly, the
lawyer or judge presented with a question about the
meaning of a contract, statute, or judicial opinion or
about the wisdom of a particular course of action-the
commercial development of certain natural resources,
for example, or cross-city busing to desegregate
schools-will as a matter of second nature ask himself
not only about the merits of the substantive question
but who it is in our system that ought to have the au
thority to decide that question and under what pro
cedures.The law creates a world by distributing
authority within it.To speak as if all questions could be
reduced to matters of substantive policy determined by
what "we" think best would destroy the constituted
"we" that is the great achievement of the law and sub
stitute for it a community divided into two parts: a
"we" that talks about and determines the policy and
those others whose lives are to be affected by it.
The law is best regarded not so much as a set of rules
and doctrines or as a bureaucratic system or as an in
strument for social control but as a culture, for the
most part a culture of argument.It is a way of making a
world with a life and a value of its own.The conversa
tion that it creates is at once its method and its point,
and its object is to give to the world it creates the kind
of intelligibility that results from the simultaneous rec
ognition of contrasting positions.This recognition is
necessary to the rational definition and pursuit even of
the most selfish ends. Without it, neither reason nor
ambition can have form or meaning.

The fact that the conversation of the law is largely
argumentative has important consequences of its own .
Legal argument exposes in clarified and self-conscious
form-in slow motion, as it were-the processes of
agreement and disagreement-of persuasion-by
which this part of our culture, and our cuJture more
generally, are defined and transformed . For in legal argument the state of the discourse itself-how we
should think and talk-is a constant subject of conscious attention and debate . This means that the contours of the culture are pushed to their limits and
marked with extraordinary distinctness. As the argument proceeds, each speaker tests the limits of his language, subjecting its every term and procedure to all
the strain that it can take-that we can take-in order
to make things come out his way. And since he must
always operate within strict limits imposed by time and
the interest of his audience, he is constantly forced to
discriminate among the arguments he might make,
putting forward what seems best, holding back what is
weak or unimportant, and so on . As the materials of
the legal culture are tested in this manner,
against each other and
against the

would never allow. Each lawyer has made every proposal for change he thinks possible and has had to accept what he cannot change . In argument of this kind
the speakers are forced to perform an allegiance to
their common language, to the ways of talking that
make the dispute intelligible and the community possible . One of the functions of a culture of argument,
the law among others, is to provide a rhetorical coherence to public life by compelling those who
disagree about one thing to express their actual or
pretended agreement about everything else. Argument functions by agreement, and by agreement under stress, and is thus constitutive of the changing
culture that even the opponents share. In compelling
this kind of agreement, the law makes disagreement at
once intelligible, limited, and amenable to resolution.
Legal argument by its nature contrasts one way of
talking with another, one version of a narrative with
another, and in this way gives its users (and their community) the benefits of contrast and tension. The lawyer speaks from and to various parts of the self, in
various modes, and is always subject to the double
duty of making sense both in ordinary English and in
the specialized language of the law. It is in fact the
inconsistencies among the lawyer's ways of talking
that gives him the purchase necessary to propose,
and to resist, changes in his discourse.

The law is best regarded not so much as a
set of rules and doctrines or as a bureaucratic system or as an instrument for social
control but as a culture, for the most part a
culture of argument.

conditions of
the world-as they are put to
work-they are defined and reorganized in especially
clear and reliable ways. This makes it possible to think
clearly about their transformation.
Consider this point in the life of the modem lawyer.
When he writes a brief or makes an argument, in court
or in a negotiation, he offers us his best performance of
the state of his art, as does the lawyer who opposes
him. Between them they provide a momentary definition of the resources and limits of their legal culture .
When the lawyers have done all they can and their capacities for argument are spent, we see where we are
in a new way, a way that the unused materials of argument, lying about without order, arrangement, or
force-mere sets of cases, rules, and commonplaces-

Argument of the legal kind thus defines a place that
is part of a larger world yet distanced from it, at once
representative and critical. It is a place something like
the place occupied by Achilles in Book 9 of the Iliad, on
the edge of his world, but here the actors have something to say about their language and can propose
changes in it. Legal argument is an organized and systematic process of conversation by which our words
get and change their meaning.

If a judge is to respond to the demands and possibilities presented by a legal case as I have outlined it,
he or she will have to speak in an extraordinarily rich
and complex way, not in a voice that is merely bureaucratic and official. To be true to the actual difficulties of
a real legal case, an opinion must be full of the kind of
life that comes from a set of acknowledged tensions:
between the two versions of the story before the court;
between the stories so told and the language of legal
29

conclusion; between the demand that like cases be
treated alike and the recognition that cases never are
"alike"; between the fidelities owed to the past and the
future and those owed to the present; between an
awareness that the case is a particular dispute between
individual persons and a sense that it is typical as well;
and so on. That the judge's voice is an individual voice,
speaking to individuals-to the parties
and their lawyers,

to future parties
and lawyers and judges-is a
performance and validation of our claim to be a government by "the People," for it is always one of us speaking to another one of us . And because legal cases arise
in new configurations, full of surprise, both argument
and judgment require more than a mechanical comparison of case with case; one must always be prepared
to make active all that one knows. In the complexity
and formality of his speech, its metaphoric character
and its openness to uncertainty, in its tension between
the general and the particular, the judge must indeed
be something of a poet. He must speak as one who has
something to learn.
I earlier suggested that it was a mark of the excellence of Samuel Johnson's moral thought, and of its
truth, that in it he struggled toward the comprehension
of contraries, and one can regard the law as an institution established on that very principle. For the legal
process of adversary thought and argument tests each
position by its opposite, each truth by an opposite
truth. In the law, as in Johnson and Jane Austen, we
find that "principles" are not merely generalities to be
applied to particular cases but complex and disciplined
attitudes of the mind and self, educated positions from
which difficulty (in Burke's sense) can be acknowledged and addressed .
Honesty requires the judge to acknowledge that his
own acts of choosing cannot be wholly explained or
justified. The good judge thus speaks in a double
voice, as one who has brought to bear as well as he can
30

the sources of authority external to himself, and as one
who makes a choice for which he is responsible. An
opinion is not merely an organized defense of his decision, the "best case" for the result reached, but an articulation of what he really thinks the case should mean,
including an expression of his doubts. The best judge,
like Socrates, exposes himself to refutation . The most
important achievement of judicial writing,
indeed, is ethical and intellectual: the manifestation in performance of a serious,
responsible, and open mind, faithful to the
sources of authority external to the self even
while contributing their transformation .
Excellence measured in this way is far more
important than excellence measured by our
agreement with the votes a judge happens
to cast, for by definition many of the cases
that he decides will be hard ones, with
much to say on both sides, and our own
positions are themselves always subject
to change. His most significant legacy
by far is his definition of his own role
and the institution of which he is a part.
From a lawyer's point of view, the
future offered by McCulloch and similar
cases is a life of argument in which
he puts together cases out of the
materials of the world, addressing
the tensions between ordinary language and
legal language and among various strains within
legal discourse, and then offers to the judge, or to the
jury, an ideal version of the case for their consideration
and persuasion. The task of the lawyer is not simply to
persuade, using whatever cultural devices lie at hand,
but to persuade a judge or jury that one result or another is the best way to act in the cultural situation defined by these facts or this evidence and by this set of
statutes and opinions and understandings. This suggests the beginnings of a response to Plato's Gorgias,
for the lawyer is not committed simply to power
through persuasion but to persuasion of a special kind
that perpetually recreates an ideal version of his inheritance. The lawyer does become like the object of his
persuasion, as Plato said the rhetorician would; but under our conventions-and the same could be said of
those by which Corcyra and Corinth addressed Athens
in Thucydides' History-the lawyer's audience is always ideal as well as real: he speaks to the judge or jury
not as they are defined by their individual interests,
passions, and biases but as they are defined by their
role, which is to do justice. He thus speaks to, and
becomes like, his own view of the best judge or juror
he can imagine, and this is one form of the best version
of himself.
The law is a set of social and inteUectual practices
that have their own reality, force, and significance. It
provides a place that is at once part of the larger culture
and apart from it, a place in which we can think about
a problematic story by retelling it in various ways and
can ask in a new and self-conscious way what it is to

mean. Law works by a process of argument that places
one version of events against another and creates a tension between them (and between the endings appropriate to each); in doing so it makes our choice of
language conscious rather than habitual and creates a
moment at which controlled change of language and
culture becomes possible. The rhetorical structure of
the law makes a place for each party and defines a relation between them by establishing the ways they may
talk; in doing this it suggests a conception of justice as
equality, for a person may find himself in any of these
roles. The method of criticism most appropriate to the
law as such is concerned less with the wisdom of a particular policy choice or the rightness of a particular rule
or result than with the character that a court, legislature, or other legal speaker gives himself and his
institution, the place it defines for others, and the
relation it establishes between them. The law is less a
branch of the social sciences than of the humanities in
that it seeks not to be a closed system but an open one .
It learns from the past and seeks new terms for the
expression of motives, new forms for the establishment
of relations; it is a method of learning and teaching;

suggest a set of possibilities implicit in the institution
and its practices, to define the kind of aim that the lawyer can have for himself. And these possibilities and
aims are remarkable. The "case arising" can be seen as
a place for cultural definition, testing, and change; as
a way of assuring continued congruence between our
languages of justice and expediency; as a means for
complicating cliches and first attitudes into deeper
understanding and for extending imaginative sympathy to those differently situated from ourselves; and,
finally, as a way of making a place of coherence in a
process of cultural change. Even more: the case establishes an essential equality between people, making
this value real; and it proceeds by a method of argument and conversation that both recognizes the individual's view of his own situation and complicates that
view by forcing him to recognize the claims of another.
It is like dialectic in that it is refutational, and it is a
kind of friendship in its insistence on the reality and
validity of others . It proceeds by a conversation in
which each speaker is invited to present an ideal version of himself, speaking to an ideal audience. ~

... the heart of law is what we always knew
it was: the open hearing in which one point
of view, one construction of language and
reality, is tested against another.
and its central concern is with the kind of relations that
we establish with our inherited culture and with each
other when we speak its language .
To conceive of the law as a rhetorical and social system, a way in which we use an inherited language to
talk to each other and to maintain a community, suggests in a new way that the heart of law is what we
always knew it was: the open hearing in which one
point of view, one construction of language and reality,
is tested against another. The multiplicity of readings
that the law permits is not its weakness but its
strength, for it is this that makes room for different
voices and gives a purchase by which culture may be
modified in response to the demands of circumstance.
It is a method at once for recognizing others, for acknowledging ignorance, and for achieving cultural
change.

James Boyd White holds appointments in English and clasThis account of the law is of course not a description
of the way every lawyer and judge in fact goes to work
or how he conceives of himself, nor is it meant to justify the actual operation and effect of our legal system,
let alone our economic system, both of which in fact
suffer from disgraceful injustices. Rather, I mean to

sics, as well as law, at Michigan. He is an associate editor of
Ethics and a member of the advisory committee of the Journal of Legal Education. He is also the author of The Legal
Imagination, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, and
Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of
the Law.
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